Now the question is Stabilize based on whose definition, does that mean "CONTROL"? Read the rest, its worth the effort as it opens our eyes to just how long, how planned this was, and just how perverse these people really are. When you read how this got started and the process they went through, you begin to wonder if this was not another "directed" study with key players on the board, helping to "rationalize" and justify to the other members who were outsiders, that their results were valid, legit and moral. What got me thinking this, was the rationale of doing a study with no moral or societal impact on individuals to be considered. See if you pick up on that as well.
Let us know in the comments section. This was a similar rational the CFR used in justifying globalizing... where the "experts" would determine policy based on technology, knowledge and processes with no consideration for the human aspects of it all. Lets remember, they are not the elected policy makers, our elected officials are and that is who must intercede between us and the psychopaths that do these studies, like Zbig and his ilk. I bet he was one of those 15.
Report Dated March 1966
Article Dated June 1967 (VN: that is how long this has been around and known)
--US. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT
--The New York Times
--Irving Louis Horowitz,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
1. This was a "Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament," headed by Gardner Ackley, of the Council of Economic Advisers. It was established by Presidential order in December, 1963, and issued a report in July, 1965.2. The Institute for Defense Analysis3. On Thermonuclear War, Thinking About the Unthinkable, On Escalation4. The Advanced Research Projects Agency, of the Department of Defense.
THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY GROUP
30 September, 1966
In general, discussions of the problems of conversion have been characterized by an unwillingness to recognize its special quality. This is best exemplified by the 1965 report of the Ackley Committee. One critic has tellingly pointed out that it blindly assumes that " ....nothing in the arms economy-- neither its size, nor its geographical concentration, nor its highly specialized nature, nor the peculiarities of its market, nor the special nature of much of its labor force--endows it with any uniqueness when the necessary time of adjustment comes."'
Let us assume, however, despite the lack of evidence that a viable program for conversion can be developed in the framework of the existing economy, that the problems noted above can be solved. What proposals have been offered for utilizing the productive capabilities that disarmament would presumably release?
The most commonly held theory is simply that general economic reinvestment would absorb the greater part of these capabilities. Even though it is now largely taken for granted (and even by today's equivalent of traditional laissez-faire economists) that unprecedented government assistance (and concomitant government control) will be needed to solve the "structural" problem of transition, a general attitude of confidence prevail that new consumption patterns will take up the slack What is less clear is the nature of these patterns.
Without singling out any one of the several major studies of the expected impact of disarmament on the economy for special criticism, we can summarize our objections to them in general terms as follows:
All such scenarios that have been seriously put forth imply a dependence on bilateral or multilateral agreement between the great powers. In general, they call for a progressive phasing out of gross armaments, military forces, weapons, and weapons technology, coordinated with elaborate matching procedures of verification, inspection, and machinery for the settlement of international disputes. It should be noted that even proponents of unilateral disarmament qualify their proposals with an implied requirement of reciprocity, very much in the manner of a scenario of graduated response in nuclear war. The advantage of unilateral initiative lies in its political value as an expression of good faith, as well as in its diplomatic function as a catalyst for formal disarmament negotiations.
One widely read analysis' estimates the annual cost of the inspection function of general disarmament throughout the world as only between two and three percent of current military expenditures. Both types of plan tend to deal with the anticipated problem of economic reinvestment only in the aggregate. We have seen no proposed disarmament sequence that correlates the phasing out of specific kinds of military spending with specific new forms of substitute spending.
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