Vatic Note: Give the undue influence and power now held by Israeli in our government, if not fully replacing it with their own people, we felt it prudent to discern just how big a threat to us is Israel and with what capacity in the way of WMD. Because I just found out that it was Israel that gave nuclear weapon technology to the North Koreans, it became important to see just how deep this rabbit hole goes, this is the first of three parts. The other two will be coming shortly afterwards. Also remember our friendly mossad biologist, Moshe who outted the Baxter, Ukrainian plant having a manufacturing facility in the Ukraine and using it to weaponize vaccines for other countries. That made us realize just how tenuous our survival and health is with their minions running our country...... the oil blow out with deadly dispursement chemicals used ring a bell???
Israels Weapons of Mass Destruction - Part I - Biological WeaponsUpdated September 2009
NTI Overview - Israel
Biological Overview
Introduction
Little is known about Israel's biological warfare (BW) program. Israel has not signed the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions (BTWC), nor explained the reasons behind its refusal to sign. Moreover, Israel has revealed virtually nothing about its activities and capabilities in the BW field; it has never issued a public policy statement on the question of BW. For all practical purposes, Israel acts as if it maintains a policy of biological ambiguity
It is commonly assumed that Israel maintains an advanced BW program, but the exact nature of the program - and whether any of it could be defined as offensively oriented - is unclear. An effort to reconstruct Israel's BW history, status, and capabilities is inescapably both conjectural and interpretative.
History
In April 1948, only weeks before the State of Israel was declared, David Ben-Gurion, the nation's founding father and first prime minister, wrote a letter to Ehud Avriel, one of the Jewish Agency's operatives in Europe, asking him to seek out and recruit East European Jewish scientists who could "either increase the capacity to kill masses or to cure masses; both things are important." Put in plain language, Ben-Gurion's request implied a search for experts in BW.[1]
Ben-Gurion's interest in BW should be placed in context. It so happened that all three scientists, who were close to Ben-Gurion at that time, Professor Ernst David Bergmann and the Katachalsky [Katzir] brothers, came from the fields of chemistry and microbiology. Professor Bergmann was already a well-established organic chemist, serving as Ben-Gurion's unofficial adviser on science and technology. The Katachalsky brothers, Aharon and Ephraim, were among the first to study chemistry at the Hebrew University in the 1930s, where they conducted molecular research that linked organic chemistry with microbiology. They both received their Ph.D. in macromolecular chemistry in 1941. The outlook of these three scientists reinforced Ben-Gurion's view that Israel's leading edge in its struggle with its enemies depended on investing in science and technology. These scientists were founders of the Science Corps within the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), a military branch known by the Hebrew acronym HEMED.[2]
In early 1948, Alexander Keynan, a graduate student in microbiology and the leader of a small Haganah (the pre-state Jewish militia) group of students from the medical school of the Hebrew University, lobbied General Yigal Yadin, the Haganah operations chief, to establish a new unit within HEMED to be devoted to BW. Yadin and Bergmann gave their blessing, and Ben-Gurion needed little persuasion to approve it. On February 18, 1948, by order from Yadin, Keynan left Jerusalem for Jaffa, where he set up his new unit. Soon the new unit was named HEMED BEIT.[3]
The creation of HEMED BEIT was controversial from the outset. Tight secrecy characterized everything related to the activities of HEMED BEIT during the 1948 war. The biological unit was insulated and isolated, physically and organizationally, from all other HEMED units. To this day, all archival material relating to HEMED BEIT is classified, hence, unavailable to scholars. But rumors about secret BW operations in Palestinian villages and towns have persisted for years.[4]
It is believed that one of the largest BW operations was in the Arab coastal town of Acre, north of Haifa, shortly before it was conquered by the IDF on May 17, 1948. According to Dr. Uri Milstein, an Israeli military historian, the typhoid epidemic that spread in Acre in the days before the town fell to the Israeli forces was not due to wartime chaos but rather the result of a deliberate covert action by the IDF—the contamination of Acre's water supply.[5]
Then, on May 23, 1948, Egyptian soldiers in the Gaza area caught four Israeli soldiers disguised as Arabs near water wells. A statement issued by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense on May 29, 1948, stated that four "Zionists" had been caught trying to infect artesian wells in Gaza with "a liquid, which was discovered to contain the germs of dysentery and typhoid." The four Israelis were put on trial, convicted, and executed by hanging three months later.[6]
At the time, Israel denied the Egyptian allegations about "bacteriological warfare," calling it a "wicked libel." It admitted only that the Israeli soldiers were involved in an intelligence operation aimed at monitoring military movements and assessing the morale of the Arab population.[7]
Still, there are many unresolved questions regarding the entire HEMED BEIT activities in the 1948 war: Was the failed Gaza operation an isolated or nearly isolated Israeli experiment with BW that ended with that failure, or part of a larger campaign? If the latter is true, how widespread was the campaign and against whom was it directed? What was the strategic rationale?
No Palestinian references exist alleging that the epidemics in Acre had resulted from Israeli sabotage. The absence of Arab reports on this incident may suggest either that the "bacteriological warfare" campaign, if it occurred, yielded limited results, or that in the chaos of the war the Palestinian refugees were unaware of the campaign. Also, if the BW operations were aimed primarily at preventing the return of the Palestinian population to their deserted villages, as Milstein claims, this could explain the relative lack of evidence of such operations.
Ultimately, however, the creation of HEMED BEIT must be understood, and judged, in the context of its time. It took place only three years after the end of World War II, at a time when the Zionist movement had just started to grapple with the devastating blow the Jewish people had suffered in the Nazi Holocaust. As a matter of historical context, every major World War II combatant had a BW program.[8]
In 1949, a period of reorganization began both at the IDF and the civilian Ministry of Defense (MOD). By the end of the war, the BW unit, HEMED BEIT, was effectively no longer under HEMED's control. As the military budget shrank in 1950-51, the IDF was determined to rid itself of the burden of supporting HEMED.
As part of the organizational restructuring, HEMED was converted into a group of MOD-sponsored civilian research centers called "Machons." The Israel Institute for Biological Research (IIBR) was founded in 1952, as a result of this restructuring, from the merger of two Machons, one of which was a continuation of HEMED BEIT. The building in the fenced grove outside Ness Ziona, which had served as the base of HEMED BEIT, became the home of IIBR. Alexander Keynan, who had led HEMED BEIT, was IIBR's first director.[9]
Furthermore, while the official mandate and rationale for IIBR's research was national security, it appears that Bergmann and Keynan were trying to extend and broaden the research mandate for the new scientific institute. They apparently hoped to build IIBR as the flagship for "national science": a research center that would conduct defense research but would also serve as the nation's main laboratory for chemistry and biology. It would mirror the functions of the U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC) and even the National Institute of Health (NIH). These different philosophies about the role of IIBR—a limited scientific infrastructure for chemical and biological weapons (CBW) research versus Bergmann's and Keynan's vision of a "national science" center—resulted in a long dispute within the MOD about the mission and role of IIBR.
As to the role of CBW in Israel's concept of national security, all indications are that from early on Ben-Gurion and his associates viewed the atomic bomb as Israel's ultimate deterrence weapon, not CBW. Nevertheless, in the 1950s and 1960s, when Israeli nuclear capability was still far off in the future, Israeli leaders probably viewed CBW as the nation's doomsday weapons, Israel's weapons of last resort.
Even in those early days, however, it appears that Israeli strategists distinguished clearly between chemical weapons and biological weapons. Chemical weapons were viewed as "nasty" but still usable weapons that Arab armies might use in the battlefield in a meaningful military fashion. The perception of biological weapons was different. Israeli military leaders did not view biological weapons as feasible military weapons for the battlefield, primarily because wars in the Middle East are short. But they recognized that biological weapons could be used in conflict as the ultimate weapons of terror.[10]
From its early days the primary mandate of the IIBR was to serve as the institutional base of Israel's commitment to maintain adequate physical infrastructure and human R&D expertise in the CBW areas. While it was recognized that Israel as a state must have a national infrastructure and expertise in these areas, the BW threat was not perceived as real and/or imminent. This assessment fits well with the relatively small size and budget of IIBR, which remained largely steady for decades.[11]
During the 1970s and 1980s, IIBR, suffered chronic budgetary and organizational difficulties; apparently on at least two occasions, IIBR even faced the possibility of being shut down as an independent research institution. A great deal of IIBR's budget came from specific scientific projects, many of them were non-classified (often from foreign sources) with no direct bearing on defense. One critical response to these financial difficulties was IIBR's effort to promote the commercialization of its products and services. Since the 1970s, IIBR has become increasingly involved in all kinds of "for profit" unclassified R&D contracts, some of them with non-Israeli entities (such as the U.S. Army).
In 1979, in response to financial difficulties, Dr. Israel Hartmann, a former director of IIBR, set up a commercial subsidiary, Life Science Israel Research (LSIR), at the IIBR campus. Its purpose is to promote chemical and biomedical projects and to market products and services developed by IIBR. LSIR also represents IIBR in all kinds of collaborations, joint ventures, and partnerships with private and public companies, all done on a commercial basis and with non-classified research.
Saddam Hussein is probably the single man most responsible for the dramatic growth of Israel's defensive BW infrastructure. Over the last decade, under the energetic leadership of IIBR director Dr. Avigdor Shafferman, IIBR as the institutional base of Israel's CBW infrastructure has witnessed an unprecedented period of expansion. When the Gulf War started in January 1991, it became evident that Israel was totally unprepared for the possibility of being attacked by Iraqi Scud missiles with chemical or biological weapon warheads. Thus Israel's policy-makers decided that those major national deficiencies must be repaired.
Throughout the mid-1990s revelations about Iraq's BW program (especially the fact that Saddam considered Israel as the target for his BW program), prompted further secret expansion of Israel's BW infrastructure. In the late 1990s, major new funds were allocated to develop an adequate defensive response, at the national level, to the Iraqi CBW threat as well as to other new bioterrorism threats. The IIBR became the primary body responsible for formulating and executing a national concept of defense against various scenarios of BW threats (primarily Anthrax bacterium [Bacillus anthracis]). The IIBR campus was expanded with new buildings, laboratories, and scientific equipment, and its staff has grown with the hiring of many new scientists.
Status
Israel has not signed the 1972 BTWC, nor has it ever explained the reasons behind its refusal. In fact, Israel has never issued a public policy statement on BW, and it acts as if it maintains a policy of biological ambiguity.
The official unclassified versions of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) reports on WMD do not name Israel as having a BW program, but this may reflect the focus of these reports on U.S. opponents. However, unofficially, and based on most previous intelligence reviews, U.S. government officials acknowledge that Israel is believed to possess biological weapons.[12] While it is assumed that Israel is advanced in R&D biodefense and possibly even maintains some sort of BW agent production capability, it is very doubtful that Israel actually produces or stockpiles BW agents (beyond defensive needs). In 2007, it was revealed that in response to a perceived Iraqi threat Israel had independently developed an anthrax vaccine during the latter half of the 1990s.[13]
Capabilities
Israel's national scientific-technical R&D capabilities in the BW field are believed to be advanced but the specifics are unknown.
In the absence of any public data, it is difficult to assess the precise nature of Israel's capabilities in the BW field. About a decade ago, a Dutch reporter named Karel Knip conducted the most extensive investigation into the history and research activities of IIBR, where Israel's BW research is undertaken. By searching Internet-based databases of scientific and medical literature, Knip turned up hundreds of scientific publications written by some 140 scientists affiliated with IIBR over nearly 50 years. Aided by eminent world authorities on CBW, Knip reconstructed a rough history of the kind of research that was conducted at IIBR in Ness Ziona.[14]
On the biological side, Knip's survey identified several types of disease agents (pathogens), toxins, and incapacitants studied at IIBR. Since the early to mid-1950s, much of the research activity focused on the causative agents of plague bacterium (Yersinia pestis), Typhus bacterium (Rickettsia prowazekii), and rabies, followed later on by studies on breeding insects that transmit those diseases, such as mosquitoes, fleas, and ticks. Interestingly, Knip noted that he found almost no IIBR publications about the standard biological weapons that Iraq produced, such as Anthrax bacterium and the Botulinum toxin, even though it is "inconceivable" (in his words) that IIBR has not conducted research into these areas. However, a more current literature search adds Anthrax bacterium to the list. It is evident that a large group of IIBR scientists has been working on Anthrax bacterium for some time.[15]
Another central area of study at IIBR since the 1950s has been research on various kinds of toxins: non-living poisons derived from plants, animals, and bacteria. According to Knip's bibliographical review, IIBR has done research on at least 15 different toxins, some of which may have been intended for use in special covert operations. One toxin on the list is Staphylococcus enterotoxin B (SEB), a potent incapacitating toxin produced by the bacterium Staphylococcus aureus. SEB was one of the toxin agents weaponized by the U.S. offensive BW program.
Knip's overall conclusion is that IIBR, since its establishment in the early 1950s, has been involved in a diverse array of research activities that, when put together, imply the possibility of offensive BW research.[16]
Although a survey of published scientific literature is a good tool to reconstruct some of the institutional research interests at IIBR, it is important to recognize its limitations. Open bibliographical analysis can suggest institutional trends, but it cannot indicate whether Israel has an offensively oriented BW program. Medical and agricultural research institutions worldwide conduct extensive basic research on disease-causing microorganisms. For this reason, Israel's motivations in the BW field, defensive or offensive, cannot be inferred merely from the existence of research activities involving potential BW agents.
Knip's bibliographical survey confirms what has been presumed all along and what IIBR seems to imply through its own website: that Israel has substantial research capabilities relevant to both defensive and offensive BW. Still, to make judgments about Israeli intentions, motivations, and strategy in the BW area—especially regarding production and weaponization—one needs to know much more.
Lacking hard information, foreign-based publications have made all kinds of claims, from the mundane to the fantastic, about Israel's BW capabilities.[17] As a matter of policy, the Israeli government has refused to comment on these reports. For this reason, any assessment of Israel's BW program and capabilities is inevitably tentative and speculative. Although most analysts believe that Israel has maintained some limited offensive BW capabilities, it is difficult to characterize exactly what those capabilities are and their current status.[18]
The U.S. government has never included Israel in its public list of states with an offensive BW capability, although it has been argued that Israel is one of two unnamed states on the list of 12 nations assessed to have an offensive program. A 1993 report on weapons proliferation by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service included an ambiguous characterization of Israel's BW capability:
There is no direct evidence of the presence of biological weapons in Israel. At the same time, according to various indications, a ramified program of biological research of a general nature, in which elements of a military-applied purpose are present, is being implemented in Israel. Specifically, Israeli research centers are cooperating closely with the American military laboratories within the framework of a US Defense Department program for protection against biological weapons. As a whole, Israel possesses a strong civilian biotechnology base, which, if necessary, could be redirected fairly easily to the production of biological weapons.[19]
Organizations/Facilities
The overall executive and coordinating agency in charge of all Israel's activities in the non-conventional field—national policy, doctrine, R&D, production capabilities, preparedness, production, etc. —is the highly classified administration of Special Means (in Hebrew Emtzaim Myuchadim) at the MOD. The head of that bureau also has the title of Assistant to the Minister of Defense for Special Means.
This Special Means Bureau at the MOD was established in 1992, by then-Minister of Defense Moshe Arens, as a direct lesson of the first Gulf War. During that war, as Israel was attacked by some 40 Iraqi Scud missiles, it became evident that too many governmental agencies and organizations had some responsibility for CBW threats, but no one was really in charge of the overall national coordination at the MOD. During the war, it became evident that Israel was not well prepared for an Iraqi CBW attack, there was no adequate chain of responsibility and command at the MOD, and there was no single authority responsible for overall coordination and preparations. The establishment of the new bureau at MOD was a direct response to this lack.
The Special Means Bureau at the Israeli MOD coordinates the missions and activities of a number of organizations. The primary R&D organization in the area of BW is IIBR.
Israel Institute of Biological Research (IIBR) (In Hebrew: Ha-Machon Habiologi)
The principal organization for scientific R&D (and, to some extent, also over matters of policy as well) in the BW area is the IIBR, which is located in the town of Ness Ziona. The IIBR's primary mandate is to serve as the locus of Israel's commitment to maintain and preserve physical infrastructure and human expertise in the area of CBW. Israel's commitment to a "knowledge base" implies advanced applied research in areas relevant to BW and bio-terrorism.
As noted earlier, the IIBR was founded in 1952 by Professor Ernest Bergmann—Ben-Gurion's science adviser and the head of R&D at MOD—and Dr. Alexander Keynan. From its inception the IIBR was structured according to a "dual identity" system. For security and some other administrative/bureaucratic purposes, it was regarded as a highly classified defense research center ("Machon 2") operated and funded by the MOD's Division of Research (EMET). But for representative and civic-scientific functions, however, it was named the Israel Institute for Biological Research (IIBR), under the jurisdiction of the prime minister's office. Bergmann recognized the intrinsic civil-military ambiguity of CBW research and thought that giving the laboratory a broad research mandate would provide a legitimate cover for its scientists. By maintaining a legitimate structure and rationale for IIBR, Bergmann sought to attract first-rate scientists by offering them the kinds of intellectual and material benefits available at academic institutions: publishing research in scientific journals, attending conferences, taking sabbatical leaves, and so forth.[20]
Today, more than five decades later, much of Bergmann's founding concept has survived the passage of time, and the changes in both science and politics. On the organizational level, the IIBR, like the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, is still formally under the jurisdiction of the prime minister's office, and all its employees are considered employees of the prime minister's office. But IIBR is coordinated and budgeted by the Special Means Bureau at the MOD. On the doctrinal-policy level, the IIBR is the agency with the primary national responsibility to identify, analyze, articulate options, and ultimately implement Israel's response to all CBW threats.
The mission statement of IIBR—as it appears in its website—reflects its broad scientific mandate, built upon the ambiguity of dual use. In accordance with this philosophy IIBR's expertise are presented in the following vague way: "Backed by five decades of experience, IIBR combines highly trained personnel with cutting-edge technologies and infra-structure to conduct applied research and development in the fields of biology, medicinal chemistry and environmental sciences, in addition to basic research studies emanating from and closely related to IIBR's applied projects."[21]
According to its website, IIBR is organized into three scientific divisions—Biology, Medicinal Chemistry, and Environmental Sciences—which "cooperate in a synergistic relationship, enabling the formation of optimum interdisciplinary teams tailored to the needs of each individual project."[22] "The Institute's staff comprises approximately 350 employees, 150 of whom are scientists holding doctorates in biology, biochemistry, biotechnology, analytic, organic and physical chemistry, pharmacology, mathematics, physics and environmental sciences. IIBR's technical staff consists of 160 certified technicians, representing a broad spectrum of capabilities."[23]
IIBR's capabilities and expertise are consistent with a full array of activities associated with a sophisticated BW program, both on the defensive and offensive sides. Yet the website carefully avoids the issues of policy motivations and intent for IIBR's research.
As long as Israel as a nation has no policy statement on the matter of BW, the objectives behind IIBR's capabilities remain obscure—even suspicious—as well.
Sources:
[1] Ben-Gurion's letter to Avriel, dated March 4, 1948, is cited in Michael Keren, Ben-Gurion and the Intellectuals (Sdeh Boker: The Ben-Gurion Research Center Press, 1988 [in Hebrew]), p. 32.
[2] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review 8 (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 29-30.
[3] Ibid, p. 31.
[4] Sara Leibovitz-Dar, "Haydakim Besherut Hamedinah" [Microbes in State Service], Hadashot, August 13, 1993, pp. 6-10.
[5] Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons," p. 31-33.
[6] Thomas J. Hamilton, "Arab Assails the Idea of Minority Shifts," New York Times, July 24, 1948; see also Leibovitz-Dar, "Haydakim Besherut Hamedinah."
[7] In 1993, however, when Israeli journalist Sarah Leibovitz-Dar asked the commander of Gaza operation whether the soldiers had been sent to gather intelligence or on a poisoning mission, he refused to respond. "You will not get answers on these questions," he said angrily. "Not from me, and not from anyone..." Leibovitz-Dar concluded that many people knew something about these operations; it was one of those open secrets that over time becomes a national taboo. Yet both participants and later historians chose to avoid the issue. See, Leibovitz-Dar, "Haydakim Besherut Hamedinah."
[8] Also, one should look at the military situation as was perceived by the Haganah leaders in early 1948, the time when HEMED BEIT was created. In response to the imminent possibility of invasion of the Arab states, the Haganah prepared a broad strategic plan, known as Plan D, to face such a contingency. While it was not a grand plan of massive expulsion, it allowed the expulsion of hostile or potentially hostile Palestinian villagers. Until mid-1948 fears of Zionist defeat, possible even annihilation, were still held in the psyche of the Yishuv's leadership. The creation of a Jewish state was not a sure proposition. The founders of HEMED BEIT shared this mind-set. They were committed to do whatever was necessary to establish a Jewish state in the land of Israel. They firmly believed that, after the Holocaust, that sacred mission could not be derailed by the luxury of moral revulsion against "dirty weapons." If microbiology could help in providing the means to establish the Jewish state, so be it.
[9] Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons," pp. 32-33.
[10] It is not known if, and to what extent, Bergmann and his IIBR colleagues made a distinction between defensive and offensive R&D. Given the climate of the times, and given the intrinsic dual nature of such research, it is highly doubtful. One might assume that they, like their CBW contemporaries in the West, thought about CBW primarily in terms of "offensive" use, and most likely in the context of retaliation. One should keep in mind that in those days, national CBW programs were not illegal, nor even at odds with international norms. In fact, by the 1950s all three major Western (and NATO) powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—had significant offensive CBW capabilities.
[11] Zafrir Rinat, "The Activity of IIBR focuses on Study of Disease Prevention," Haaretz, December 12, 1997.
[12] Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Intelligence Review Is Softening Some Judgments About Illicit Arms Abroad", New York Times, November 18, 2003.
[13] "Controversy Over Secret Anti-Anthrax Trials, Gas Mask Distribution Plague Israeli Passive Defense Efforts," WMD Insights, Issue 18, September 2007, p. 6-11, www.wmdinsights.com/ I18/ I18_ ME1_ Controversy Over Secret.htm; "Israel developed own anthrax vaccine," Agence France Presse, 15 May 2007; Dan Williams, "Israel developed version of anthrax vaccine," The China Post,16 May 07, www.chinapost.com.tw.
[14] Karel Knip's detailed expose, "Biologie in Ness Ziona," was published on February 27, 1999 in the Dutch (Rotterdam) daily newspaper, NRC Handelsband. The articles in Dutch can be found on the NRC website, www.nrc.nl/ w2/ Lab/ Ziona/. Karel Knip generously provided the author a nine-page English translation of his article under the title "Biology in Ness Ziona." All of the quotes that appear here are from the English document that Knip provided the author.
[15] Ibid.
[16] In Knip's words, "The many hundreds of articles prove beyond doubt that the IIBR is Israel's main center for research into both chemical and biological weapons. The research conducted at the Institute consists of a bizarre combination of activities which acquire significance within one specific context, that of chemical and biological warfare." [cite for this quote?]
[17] Many of these sensationalist stories appeared in the London Sunday Times. One cites a biologist, who once held a senior post in the Israeli intelligence, stating that "there is hardly a single known or unknown form of chemical or biological weapon that is not manufactured at the Institute." Uzi Mahnaimi, "Israeli Jets Equipped for Chemical Warfare," London Sunday Times, October 4, 1998, www.sunday-times.co.uk. See also, "Israel's Secret Institute," Foreign Report, August 20, 1998; "Israel's Ness Ziona Mystery," Foreign Report, February 5, 1998.
[18] U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risk, Report No. OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 65, 80. The OTA report cites 11 public sources (government and NGO arms control experts as well as media). As to the BW issue, the report cites six public sources of which four (67 percent) refer to Israel as "having undeclared offensive biological warfare programs" (Table 2-B-1, p. 82).
[19] Russian Federation's Foreign Intelligence Service, "A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," January 28, 1993; translated into English by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FIBS), March 5, 1993, and published in U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Affairs, "Proliferation Threats of the 1990s".
[20] In those days, national CBW programs were not illegal or even at odds with international norms. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of CBW, is silent about developing, producing, and stockpiling such weapons. Moreover, many countries that ratified the Geneva Protocol did so while reserving the right to employ CBW for retaliation in kind. (In any case, Israel signed the 1925 Geneva protocol only in February 1969). By the 1950s, all three major Western (and NATO) powers--the United States, the United Kingdom, and France--had offensive CBW capabilities. Bergmann was well aware of those activities.
[21] Website of The Israel Institute for Biological Research, www.iibr.gov.il
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid. This level of staffing constitutes an increase over that of 2004. The number of technical staff has increased from 100 to 160.
The article is reproduced in accordance with Section 107 of title 17 of the Copyright Law of the United States relating to fair-use and is for the purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.
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